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Abstract 
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation 
by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other 
motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show 
that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with 
expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are 
suggested.
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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
Social dilemmas involve a conflict between a cooperative strategy, benefiting the group 
but potentially costly to the individual, and a defection strategy, detrimental to the group but 
benefiting the individual. A common social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma involving four 
types of payoffs as indicated in figure 1 where T>R>P>S (Rapoport, 1967). Mutual 
cooperation brings a reward (R) payoff to each player; mutual defection leads to a punishment 
(P) payoff; when one player cooperates (resp. defects) while the other defects (resp. 
cooperates), he gets the sucker (S) payoff (resp. the temptation payoff). 
 
Player j’s strategy 
Player i’s strategy C D 
C R,R S,T 
D T,S P,P 
Figure 1. Typical prisoner’s dilemma 
 
Low levels of contribution are frequently reported in games with a prisoner’s dilemma 
structure. Two main drivers are greed and fear (Ahn et al., 2001). Out of greed, one player 
may defect to benefit from the good at the expense of the other player. Out of fear, individuals 
may prefer to defect to avoid the sucker payoff. The greed motivation is the classical 
opportunistic free-riding behavior. The fear motivation is an aversion to the sucker payoff. 
Even if the outcomes seem similar between greed and fear motivation –that is reduced 
contributions to public goods– the drivers are different. Indeed, greed leads to free riding 
behavior and is an opportunistic behavior where the individual seeks to consume more than 
his fair share of a public resource while defection out of fear is a priori non-opportunistic and 
results from the uncertainty concerning others’ behaviors. 
The aversion to the sucker’s payoff has been notably introduced in the analysis of public 
goods with threshold effects. In this case, the agent does not contribute for the production of a 
public good because he fears that the good will not be produced because too many other 
players will defect. Given that the production of the public good requires a minimum level of 
contributions, if the contributions are insufficient, the good will not be produced and the 
individual will feel he squandered his contribution1 (Sen, 1967; Runge, 1984; Schmidtz, 
1991; Wiener and Doescher, 1991). For example, a driver can renounce purchasing an 
environmentally friendly car because he is convinced that his isolated contribution is too 
weak to induce a perceptible improvement in air quality, except if he is convinced that a 
sufficient number of other drivers will also contribute by purchasing an environmentally 
friendly car2.  While the aversion to the sucker’s payoff is exacerbated in the case of public 
goods with threshold effects, we contend that it remains an impediment to higher 
contributions, even when there is no threshold effect. 
In a survey, Rapoport and Chammah (1965) showed that cooperation rates in prisoner’s 
dilemmas increase when the ‘sucker’ payoff decreases. The ‘strong [emphasis added] desire 
to avoid being a sucker’ is supported by an empirical regularity that ‘when a manipulation 
(…) has the effect of increasing the likelihood that the group’s goal will be achieved, subjects 
are more likely to cooperate’ (Wiener and Doescher, 1991; see also Taschian et al., 1984). 
Using experimental games, Fehr and Gachter (2000) demonstrate that people are willing to 
                                                 
1
 Sen (1967) defines this problem as the assurance problem. 
 
2
 Another example can be related to the effects of seed money and refunds which increase significantly the 
contribution level of charitable giving (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002). 
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punish free-riding –even if it is costly for them– in order to avoid getting the sucker’s 
outcome. 
Aversion to the sucker’s payoff stems from many behavioral assumptions. Wilkinson-Ryan 
(2008) discusses what it is in the sucker payoff that deters from cooperation. The authors 
argue that to be a sucker, three conditions must be satisfied. First, the individual must “either 
give more than he gets or get less than he deserves”. That points to fairness considerations. 
Second, “the victim must have evinced some kind of trust for his eventual antagonist, and 
then had that trust betrayed”. That is linked to trust and betrayal. And finally, “each sucker 
has to some extent contributed to his own state” that is “it involves self-blame”. Indeed, the 
dimensions involved in the sucker’s payoff aversion are manifold. Obviously, we will not be 
able to deal with them all but we focus on the aversion to others contributing an overall 
amount of less than 75% of the individual’s contribution (see next section).  
 
In this article, we study an insurance mechanism to increase cooperation in the face of 
sucker’s payoff aversion. Since sucker’s payoff aversion stems from the uncertainty on other 
players’ behavior rather than from opportunistic behavior, we investigate the impact of an 
insurance mechanism where players are insured against large losses in case they are the only 
contributors in the group. Rather than advocating for insurance schemes or contracts from a 
theoretical viewpoint (e.g., Schmidtz, 1991), we question their effectiveness to improve the 
funding of public goods. In order to disentangle the effect of the sucker’s payoff aversion 
from other factors on the level of contributions, we design a public good game where 
participants are partially insured against defection by other players. The contribution level to 
public goods when a partial insurance mechanism is implemented has not been investigated in 
the literature. In other words, our paper answers to the following question: does the provision 
of an insurance mechanism lead to higher levels of contribution to public goods and to what 
extent? We report two main results. First, we corroborate that aversion to the sucker’s payoff 
matters in overall contribution to public goods. The implementation of an insurance 
mechanism has a positive impact on the individual’s contribution. Second, the insurance 
mechanism also affects the individual’s expectations regarding the contributions of other 
participants. As all other agents also benefit from the same insurance mechanism, their 
incentive to defect is equally reduced. This effect simultaneously (i) reinforces the positive 
effect of the insurance mechanism at the individual’s level as the probability to end up with 
the sucker’s payoff is reduced, ceteris paribus but (ii) also decreases the overall individual’s 
contribution because he expects that given that other players will contribute more, he can 
contribute less. Ultimately, the overall effect of implementing an insurance mechanism on the 
individual’s contribution remains positive. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment and 
stipulates the theoretical predictions. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 
concludes and provides some policy implications.  
 
 
2. Experimental Design and Implementation 
 
In this section we present the experimental design and the theoretical predictions given our 
treatments and our choice of parameters for the experiment. 
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2.1. Basic design 
 
We use two treatments namely the Reference treatment that corresponds to a standard 
public good game and the Insurance treatment where we provide subjects with an insurance 
against the risk of getting the sucker’s payoff. In the Reference treatment, subjects are 
endowed with 20 tokens they allocate between a private investment which earns one euro per 
token and a public investment which earns 0.4€ per token as in any standard public good 
experiment. Given other players' contribution ic− , player i  chooses the level of contribution   
ic  that maximizes the following payoff function: 
 
1
( , ) 20 0.4 20 0.6 0.4
n
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k
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=
= − + = − +∑  
 
In the Reference treatment, the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing and the social 
optimum to contribute all the endowment. The reason for low contributions may lie in greed 
(leading to free riding behavior) but also in fear (the aversion to the sucker’s payoff). To 
distinguish these effects, we design a second treatment. 
 
In the Insurance treatment, subjects have the same payoff function as in the Reference 
treatment except that another payoff function (alternative payoff) substitutes to the standard 
payoff if the other players in the group is too low. Given other players' contribution ic− , 
player i  chooses the level of contribution ic  that maximizes the following payoff function: 
 
( , ) [ (20 0.6 0.4 );(20 0.3 ) ]i i i i iv c c Max c c c− −= − + −  
 
The Nash equilibrium of this game is still to contribute nothing and the social optimum to 
contribute all. However, the worst payoff for player i  that is to be the only one to contribute 
("sucker's payoff") is now relatively better, ( ,0) 20 0.3i iv c c= −  (in the Reference treatment, 
this worst payoff was ii ccu 6.020)0,( −= ). Note that the insurance mechanism insured against 
the case where the others give an overall contribution of less than 75% of the individual’s 
contribution. The individual is indeed indifferent to the insurance mechanism when 
3 4i ic c− = . 
 
2.2. Predictions 
 
Figure 2 displays (i) in plain lines, player i ’s payoff as a function of his own contribution 
and depending on the contribution of the three other players and (ii) in dotted lines, the player 
i ’s alternative payoff as a function of his own contribution. 
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Figure 2. Player i’s payoff as a function of his own contribution in the Reference 
treatment (with increasing levels of contribution of the three other players – plain lines) 
and in the alternative payment scheme (dotted line) 
 
 First, notice that all the payoffs functions in the Reference treatment have the same slope 
(-0.6) and are upward shifted with an increase of the other players’ contributions. Second, 
notice that the alternative payoff scheme has a negative lower slope of -0.3 and is independent 
of the other players’ contribution. In other words, it constitutes a partial and imperfect 
insurance mechanism against non or too weak contributions by other players.  Third, in the 
Reference treatment, we clearly see the Nash equilibrium for player i: whatever the 
contribution of the other players, payoff is maximized for a zero individual contribution. 
Several cases appear revealing player i ’s strategy in the Insurance treatment as compared 
to the Reference treatment: 
(i) When 0ic− = , the alternative payoff is always higher than the Reference payoff. If 
player i has an aversion to the sucker payoff, then contributions should be higher in the 
Insurance treatment as compared to the Reference treatment. 
(ii) When 15ic− ≥ , the payoff of player i in the Reference treatment is always higher than 
the alternative payoff. Thus, whatever the contribution of the other players, player i should 
display the same type of strategy in the Insurance and Reference treatments. 
(iii) When 0 15ic−< < , the lines representing the Reference payoff and the alternative 
payoff cross each other. If player i is a relatively big contributor to the public good 
( 4 3i ic c−> ), then the Insurance treatment provides higher payoffs than the Reference 
treatment. However, if player i is a relatively small contributor ( 4 3i ic c−≤ ), the Insurance 
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treatment is equivalent to the Reference treatment. In a pure ‘homo economicus’ model, the 
Insurance mechanism should play no role even when 0 15ic−< < . Non contribution remains 
the dominant strategy. However, with other models of behavior where human beings are not 
‘pure egoists’ (e.g., Croson, 2007), the Insurance mechanism will play a role. What behavior 
can we expect? By providing an insurance against the sucker payoff to all participants, the 
Insurance mechanism leads the individual to anticipate that others will contribute more. This 
anticipation can exert an influence in two opposite ways. On the one hand, if the individual 
exhibits reciprocal preferences, he will contribute more to match the higher contributions of 
other participants. On the other hand, if the individual exhibits altruistic preference that can be 
crowded out by expectations that other participants will contribute at higher levels, he will 
decrease his own contribution. In sum, in addition to the direct effect of the Insurance 
mechanism on the individual i , there is also an indeterminate indirect effect through the 
individual’ expectations on the contribution levels of other participants.  
 
 
3. Experimental results 
 
We first present the sample and the sessions, then some summary statistics and finally the 
econometric results. 
 
3.1. Sample and sessions 
 
The experiment has been performed at the ENGREF (Nancy, France) and gathered a 
sample of 64 students (Table I). Subjects were randomly distributed among groups of four 
players. In each session, there were 4 groups. There were two sessions per treatment. 
 
Table I. Organized sessions 
Session Treatment Number of 
groups 
Number of 
participants 
1 Reference 4 16 
2 Reference 4 16 
3 Insurance 4 16 
4 Insurance 4 16 
 
3.2. Sample statistics 
 
The average group contribution is 22.625 tokens (standard deviation: 18.226) for the 
Reference treatment and 27.863 (standard deviation: 15.532) for the Insurance treatment. 
Figure 3 gives a box plot representation of the average group contribution over the periods 
and reveals a higher median for the groups in the Insurance treatment. A two-sample 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed to test for a difference of distribution of group 
contributions between the two treatments. The results suggests group contributions were 
higher in the Insurance treatment at a 1% significance level (z= -6.258). 
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Figure 3: Box plot of average group contribution as a function of the treatment 
 
The statistical analysis does not take into account the panel structure of the data. We take it 
into account in the econometric analysis. 
 
3.3. Econometric results 
 
Our data displays a panel structure and we are interested in time-invariant variables such as 
the treatment. The use of a random effect model that includes dummy variables for groups 
shows there is no individual specific effect. Thus, we use an ordinary least square model. 
0 1 2 3 4
1
i -i k k i
k
c Insurance E(c ) Period Group eα α α α α
≠
= + + + + +∑  
The dependent variable is an individual i's contribution to the public good ( ic ). 
Independent variables are the treatment dummy variable (Insurance) equal to one if the 
treatment is the Insurance treatment, an individual i 's expectations on what the other three 
individuals in his group will contribute in the same period t (
-iE(c ) ), the period number 
(Period), and an indicator variable for each group minus one (Group).  
Individual i 's expectations on others' behavior is unobservable. Thus, we used three 
proxies for the variable
-iE(c )  (as in Cason and Gangadarhan, 2002 or in Croson, 2007). We 
consider that player i  updates his beliefs on others' behavior on a period by period basis. In 
the actual computation method, we simply use the actual contribution of other players in the 
group as a proxy for individual i 's expectations. In the myopic computation method, player i  
takes account only of the last period without considering the preceding periods. In the non-
myopic computation method, player i  updates his beliefs in period (N+1) by a weighted mean 
where the behavior of others in period (N-1) is projected on periods 1 to (N-2). The three 
computation methods yield the same results. In the article, we display only the actual 
computation method. Table II presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. 
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Table II. Description and statistics of variables used in the regression analysis  
Variable Description #Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
ic  Individual i's contribution to the public good 1280 6.311 (6.732) 
Insurance Dummy (=1 if Insurance treatment and 0 
otherwise) 
1280 0.500 
(0.500) 
-iE(c )  Individual i's expectations on what the other 
three individuals in his group will contribute 
1280 18.933 
(13.856) 
 
The econometric results for all individuals are presented in Table III. In line with the 
predictions in section 2.2., we have introduced an interaction effect between the treatment and 
the expectations. 
 
Table III. OLS regression of individual i's contribution to the public good for all 
individuals 
 Coefficient SD P>|t| 
Insurance 2.160 0.949 0.023 
Expectations 
-0.136 0.028 0.000 
Insurance X Expectations 0.068 0.032 0.034 
Period 
-0.401 0.033 0.000 
Constant 6.905 0.776 0.000 
(Dummies for group not reported here) 
 
   
Nb obs. 1280 
Adj-R2 0.2701 
 
From table III, we see that the Period has always a negative effect on individual 
contributions. It is a common result in experimental data. The data analysis shows a positive 
effect of the principal effect of Insurance treatment. The alternative payoff provides 
participants with an insurance against the risk of getting the sucker's payoff. Individuals are 
averse to the sucker's payoff. The principal effect of expectations is negative, although small. 
According to the analysis performed by Croson (2007), this negative correlation associated 
with positive levels of contributions reveals altruism on the part of participants. There is a 
crowding out effect. When participants expect high contributions from others in the group, 
they will decrease their contribution to the public good. Given such behavioral patterns, we 
predicted an increased negative effect of expectations in the Insurance treatment. However, 
the interaction effect between the Insurance treatment and the expectations is positive, 
although small. When the treatment has an insurance device against the sucker payoff, higher 
expectations will lead to higher contributions.  
  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We examined the effect of the aversion to the sucker’s payoff on contribution to public 
goods, using experimental games. Our results confirm that the aversion to the sucker’s payoff 
plays a significant role in explaining contribution to public goods. Implementing an insurance 
mechanism plays a direct positive role on the individual’s contribution and a positive indirect 
role through the individual's expectations on other's contribution. When the expected 
cooperation rate is relatively high, the insurance scheme reinforces the positive role of 
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expectations. A clear implication from our study is that public goods contribution schemes 
can increase the size of individual contributions thanks to refunding mechanisms in the event 
that the provision point is not reached. If people perceive their contribution as pivotal, that is, 
their contribution will ‘make a difference’3, they are more likely to contribute more. 
Our study has limitations that give room for several extensions. For example, our insurance 
mechanism was partial and we do not investigate how different levels of insurance (from no 
insurance to full insurance) can impact on overall contribution to public goods with respect to 
the anticipated cooperation rate. An additional extension relates to the effect of heterogeneous 
agents (e.g. big and small contributors to public goods) on the functioning of insurance 
schemes. Moreover, in real life, insurance mechanisms can correspond to various devices that 
are likely to impact differently on contributions (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002). We 
contend that people may, regardless from the end-outcome, extract ‘procedural’ utility from 
the way the insurance scheme is functioning (Benz et al., 2004). For instance, the common 
knowledge of the presence of a sufficient portion of individuals willing to contribute to the 
public goods, regardless of others’ contributions in the population can provide a natural 
‘insurance mechanism’ preventing to some extent the aversion to the sucker’s payoff in a 
different way when compared to a formal contract reimbursing people in case of insufficient 
overall contributions. This natural insurance mechanism may explain why ecolabelling 
schemes performs much better in some countries (e.g., Germany) compared to other countries 
(e.g. France). 
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